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Abstract
We examine whether CDS contracts written on individual banks are effective leading indicators of
bank financial distress during a period of systemic bank crisis. Changes in CDS spreads are found
to yield a robust signal of failure across a set of European and US banks, in keeping with indirect
market discipline. Furthermore, changes in CDS spreads provide information about the condi-
tion of banks which supplements that available from equity markets and contained in accounting
metrics. Our findings hold out-of-sample, for various cohorts, for subordinated CDS spreads, for
idiosyncratic changes in CDS and are robust to the use of alternative measures of bank distress,
including rating downgrades and accounting risk.
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1. Introduction
In contrast to many other industries, banks, and financial institutions more generally, are sub-
ject to high levels of regulatory oversight. Regulatory supervision may also be supplemented by
market forces in two primary ways (Flannery, 2001). First, changes in market prices may be linked
to increased funding costs, limiting risk taking and inducing direct market discipline. Second, mar-
ket prices may act as a signal to investors, policy makers and supervisors regarding the condition
of individual financial institutions, leading to indirect market discipline. Moreover, such market
signals may be employed as inputs to early warning models of bank financial distress. Previous
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studies have indicated mixed success in using market-based information to distinguish between
safe and distressed banks, in particular for bond markets. Firm-level credit default swaps (CDS)
present many advantages over bond markets in terms of price discovery, liquidity and standard-
ization. In light of these benefits, we address the following research question: Do firm-level CDS
contracts act as effective and distinct leading indicators of bank vulnerability to distress?
For banks with actively traded securities, changes in prices of equity and debt act as a source of
market information regarding the market’s perception of their financial condition. Equity investors
appear well placed to provide market discipline, given their status as residual claimants in the event
of default. One argument against this view is that equity investors may condone increased risk
taking, being the primary beneficiaries from any upside gains (Gropp et al., 2006). For this reason,
bond markets and, in particular, subordinated debt have been considered as a means to promote
market discipline. If debt markets accurately reflect bank risks, banks may be discouraged from
adopting riskier strategies to ward off potential increases in funding costs. In practice, however, the
use of debt markets to monitor banks is beset by implementation problems, such as differing yields
for bond issues from a single institution, and illiquidity (Gropp et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2007).
We examine whether single-name CDS can distinguish between safe and distressed banks using
a sample encompassing the global financial crisis. A CDS is a protection or insurance agreement
between two parties, whereby the protection seller undertakes, in exchange for a premium paid
by the protection buyer, to make a payment if a specified credit event occurs (Chiaramonte and
Casu, 2013). As a signal of bank condition, CDS offer a number of differences and potential
benefits relative to corporate debt markets. First, the CDS market is attractive due to smaller
trading frictions compared to the underlying bond (Oehmke and Zawadowski, 2014). Second,
CDS market prices are standardized with constant maturity, whereas uniform bond yields can only
be obtained by interpolating bond yields of different maturities (Blanco et al., 2005). Third, CDS
markets are more liquid than corporate debt markets (Longstaff et al., 2005). Finally, CDS spreads
tend to lead bond markets in price discovery (Blanco et al., 2005). Related to this, CDS markets
are also shown to reveal information in advance of the equity market (Acharya and Johnson, 2007).
Given these strong relative benefits, CDS contracts seem well placed to act as an indicator of bank
distress, thus providing indirect market discipline.
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In this paper we provide the first analysis of the capacity of CDS contracts on individual banks
to act as a signal of a bank’s financial condition. Relative to accounting and equity information, we
investigate the marginal contribution of changes in CDS spreads in forecasting bank distress during
the years 2004-2012, a period of systemic banking crisis during which many banks failed. Previous
literature has considered the propensity of aggregate CDS spreads (based on broad CDS indices)
to act as a signal of bank distress (Knaup and Wagner, 2012), investigated the drivers of bank CDS
spreads during the global financial crisis (Chiaramonte and Casu, 2013) and the interdependence of
sovereign and bank CDS during times of market turbulence (Alter and Schüler, 2012). In contrast,
this paper focuses on single-name CDS contracts associated with debt of individual institutions.1
Empirical findings indicate that changes in CDS spreads help to explain forthcoming distress
in banks, whilst controlling for alternative drivers. The economic significance is substantial: a one
standard deviation increase in CDS spread changes is associated with an increase in bank failure
probability ranging from 7% to 14%. Moreover, our results indicate that CDS spreads incorporate
information about the condition of banks which is above and beyond that available from both equity
market indicators and traditional accounting metrics. This is in keeping with indirect market disci-
pline, as CDS contracts signal increasing borrowing costs for distressed firms. Findings are shown
to be robust for alternative dependent variables (rating downgrades and accounting risk), subordi-
nated CDS, excluding US banks, for various cohorts, and for excess and idiosyncratic changes in
CDS. While our findings are constrained by a small data sample of banks having traded CDS, the
evidence presented points to the potential for CDS to contribute to indirect market discipline.
In the following section we describe literature relevant to this study. Data and methodology are
detailed in Section 3. Empirical results are provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Corporate governance of financial institutions is constrained by many factors, not least the
problem that small depositors may not be able to distinguish between safe and risky institutions, the
1Single-name or firm-level CDS contracts are a derivative where the underlying instrument is a bond of a particular
company.
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opaque nature of banking assets, and the dangers of contagion from a single distressed institution
(Flannery, 1998). Thus, government oversight aims to promote stability in the banking sector,
protecting depositors through provision of deposit insurance and acting as a lender of last resort
to mitigate contagion due to illiquidity. Market discipline, as provided for in the Basel II accord,
aspires to complement regulatory oversight. This may be achieved through two channels: by
means of direct influence on management risk taking and, indirectly, through market monitoring
of banks’ financial position (Flannery, 2001). If market discipline exists, then changes in the
prices of liabilities or equities, both absolute and relative to competitors, should be related to
changes in measures of risk (Mayes, 2004; Gorton and Santomero, 1990). On this basis, empirical
evidence for market discipline has been mixed. Flannery (1998) suggests that investors could
provide further market discipline for large, traded U.S. banks, but that this may be impeded by
government oversight and the potential for state intervention in distressed institutions.
The failure and near-failure of many systemically important banks during the global financial
crisis and subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, has again brought banking regulation to
the forefront. The considerable underperformance of many banks during this period has been
variously attributed to a dependence on short-term funding, high leverage, lack of diversification,
credit expansion and higher share of volatile non-interest income (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2013;
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Altunbas et al., 2011). Moreover, factors common to previous crises,
including historical bank equity performance, have been shown to explain distress for individual
institutions during the global financial crisis (Cole and White, 2012; Fahlenbrach et al., 2012). In
this study, we build on previous analyses of bank failure during the global financial crisis. The
abundance of distressed banks during the period encompassing the global financial crisis and the
introduction of novel financial instruments such as CDS provide a fresh opportunity to determine
whether financial markets are helpful in explaining the failure of financial institutions.
Evidence suggests that equity markets display efficiency in processing information and, so,
should act as a strong indicator of a firm’s financial position (Gropp et al., 2006). Considering
the potential of equity markets to act as a signal of bank fragility, Distinguin et al. (2006) and
Curry et al. (2008) provide evidence of forecasting ability. In contrast, Krainer (2004) finds little
additional ability to forecast changes in supervisor ratings from equity market information relative
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to supervisory factors. Gropp et al. (2006) use equity market data to develop a distance-to-default
(DD) metric, suggested as a complement to bond information in signaling bank fragility. Milne
(2014) find poor forecasting performance of the DD measure prior to the onset of the subprime
crisis. Bliss and Flannery (2002) find limited evidence for equity market discipline in influencing
managerial actions. In this study, we again assess whether equity markets help in distinguishing
between safe and distressed banks and provide a comparison to the contribution of CDS markets.
Changes in bond credit spreads provide a further source of information regarding a bank’s
financial condition. Evidence for the effectiveness of debt markets is, however, mixed. Krishnan
et al. (2005) show that credit spread levels are associated with risk taking behavior but that changes
in spread levels are not. Gorton and Santomero (1990) find little support for subordinated debt in
limiting bank risk taking following the 1980s expansion of the government safety net. Similarly,
Evanoff and Wall (2001) suggest that market information embedded in subordinated debt yield
spreads is too noisy to serve as a trigger for corrective action. Considering the recent global
financial crisis, Miller et al. (2015) find no evidence that subordinated note yields act as a reliable
signal of bank distress. In sharp contrast, a variety of studies have documented evidence that debt
markets reflect the riskiness of financial institutions (see, for example, Gropp et al., 2006; Sironi,
2003). Models examining the potential of subordinated debt to provide market discipline have also
arrived at disparate conclusions (Chen and Hasan, 2011; Niu, 2008; Blum, 2002).
Credit default swaps have been actively traded since the early 2000s, with liquidity and avail-
ability generally increasing over the decade.2 CDS have a variety of features which may make
them a better proxy than bonds in providing market discipline for banks. Oehmke and Zawad-
owski (2014) suggest that speculative credit trading volume concentrates in the CDS rather than
bond markets. Moreover, CDS spreads are less affected by illiquidity than bond spreads: Longstaff
et al. (2005) find that the nondefault component of corporate bonds is strongly related to bond-
specific illiquidity measures as well as aggregate bond market liquidity measures. Huang and
2CDS notionals doubled each year from 2004 ($6.4 trillion) until 2007 ($58.2 trillion) before being hit by the
outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008 (where notionals traded declined to $42 trillion). By the end of 2012, the size of
the CDS market was similar to the period preceding the subprime crisis of 2007. See www.bis.org and www.dtcc.com
for more information on notional amounts traded on both single-name and index CDS contracts.
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Huang (2012) and Elton et al. (2001) also find that credit risk typically accounts for less than 20
percent of corporate-Treasury yield spreads. Blanco et al. (2005) documents a higher price dis-
covery for CDS spreads relative to corporate bonds. Finally, evidence of faster CDS information
processing ability relative to the equity market is also shown (Acharya and Johnson, 2007). The
authors find that CDS markets reveal information in advance of the equity market for entities that
experience (or are likely to experience) adverse credit events.
Interest in bank CDS has increased markedly since the global financial crisis. Stânga (2014)
and Avino and Cotter (2014) examine the relationship between bank and sovereign CDS spreads
from the onset of the global financial crisis. Analyzing the potential for market discipline in the
CDS market, Völz and Wedow (2011) point to the influence of bank size on CDS prices. Chiara-
monte and Casu (2013) evaluate the determinants of bank CDS spreads and demonstrate a ten-
dency for considerable time variation. Hasan et al. (2016) also find a significant contemporaneous
relationship between CDS spreads and structural variables, and a weaker link with CAMELS indi-
cators. Considering the case of a single distressed bank, Northern Rock, Hamalainen et al. (2012)
determine that equity markets provide a stronger signal of impending problems than debt or CDS
markets. Finally, a number of studies have used aggregate CDS spreads and CDS indices to exam-
ine bank fragility (Ballester et al., 2016; Knaup and Wagner, 2012; Calice et al., 2012). Building
on the extant literature considering banks and CDS contracts, the present study assesses the cross-
sectional ability of single-name bank CDS contracts to perform a disciplining role on banks.
3. Data and Methodology
We now describe our sample of bank CDS, in addition to the accounting-based and market-
related variables employed as inputs to the bank distress models. Theory and mathematical repre-
sentation of the logit model used to explain bank failure is further detailed.
3.1. Data
In order to test the ability of CDS to distinguish between safe and distressed banks, we obtain
single-name five year CDS spreads from Markit. Markit provides consensus CDS prices after
aggregating contributions from various dealers on a daily basis. The initial data set contains 538
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financial firms with senior CDS data. We restrict our main focus to banks and start by applying
data filters, including “Banks”, “Diversified Banks” and “Financial Services” sectors, leaving 259
firms. Banks whose headquarters are not in the US or Europe are then removed, resulting in 142
firms. Next, excluding firm without accounting information results in a final sample of 60 firms
with CDS data available over the sample period 2004-2012. The size of the final sample, while
potentially smaller than might be available for an analogous study considering equities, is larger
than available for previous studies considering cross-sectional properties of bank CDS, such as
Ballester et al. (2016), Yang and Zhou (2013), Annaert et al. (2013) and Eichengreen et al. (2012).
We select the 2004-2012 period because (i) we are interested in assessing the explanatory
power of CDS before and around periods of crisis (in particular, the financial crisis of 2007-2009
and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis beginning from 2010); (ii) the CDS market
is well developed and mature during this cohort. These choices help to ensure that our empirical
study is focused on a liquid, actively traded security during a period of significant instability for the
banking industry. Furthermore, we focus primarily on annual data as fundamental accounting data
is not available on a more regular basis, especially for European banks. The set of cross-sectional
bank CDS spreads are then used to investigate whether single-name CDS help in explaining bank
financial distress. We use the yearly change in the log CDS spread (∆CDS ) as the main variable
to explain bank default. The control variables employed to control for various facets of banking
risk consist of both accounting and market variables. Accounting variables employed are obtained
from Bureau Van Dijk’s BankScope database and include the tier 1 regulatory capital ratio (T1RC),
the loan-loss-provisions-to-assets ratio (LLPTA), the cost-income ratio (CI), the return on average
equity (ROAE), the liquidity ratio (LADEPST) and the log of total assets (SIZE).
In this paper, the marginal ability of CDS spreads to explain bank failure relative to equity-
derived measures is further studied. Individual equity prices are obtained from Thomson Datas-
tream. Market related variables are represented by the log stock return, calculated on an annual
basis (STOCK) and the distance-to-default measure (DD) computed for each time period t using
equity market volatility as in Gropp et al. (2006).
We next define our main measure of bank distress employed. During the global financial crisis
and subsequent sovereign debt crisis, a large number of European and US banks suffered financial
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distress of one form or another. A bank is defined as having failed if it was nationalized or recap-
italized, using either ordinary or preferred share capital, by the state. Data regarding the failure
status of each bank was gathered from a variety of sources (Conlon and Cotter, 2014; Altunbas
et al., 2011; Goddard et al., 2009; Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009). Our measure is binary, taking a
value of one when a bank failed, and a value of zero otherwise. In Appendix A we present the full
list of variables used in our study.
Panel A of Table 1 provides a summary of the main properties of our primary failure indicator
during the period 2005-2012. A large proportion of the failures occur in 2008 with the outbreak
of the subprime crisis: 20 banks from a total of 60 failed and the failure rate is highest at 33.3%.
During the sample period, a total of 31 banks are deemed to have been either nationalized or
recapitalized and regarded as having failed. From a total of 60 banks, we have 11 US institutions
which failed by the end of 2009. While the US was the epicenter of the global financial crisis, the
number of failed large banks was small relative to Europe. The analysis of 11 failed US institutions
is in keeping with Beck et al. (2013), where the sample consisted of 12 failed US and 43 failed
European banks. Furthermore, Ballester et al. (2016) document only 5 US banks with available
CDS, compared to 50 European banks over a similar time period.
In Table 1 we also show the summary statistics for all the explanatory variables used in the
empirical analysis for both the whole sample of banks (Panel B) and the sample of failed banks
(Panel C) during the period 2005-2011.3 The mean and standard deviation of the change in log
CDS spreads is higher for the sample of failed banks than for the entire sample. Similar differences
can be observed for most of the remaining variables. Failed banks have less capital, higher cost to
income ratio, a higher return on average assets and are larger than the average. In our sample 17
banks are unlisted and, for this reason, the number of observations for the stock market variables
(namely, STOCK and DD) are reduced relative to the other variables.
3Note that we exclude year 2012 from this table because our sample period ends in 2012. Thus, for banks which
failed in 2012, we would be using explanatory variables up until year 2011.
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3.2. Methodology
In order to investigate the explanatory power of CDS spreads for banking failure, we follow
Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004) and estimate the probabilities of failure over the
next period using a logit model. In particular, we assume that the marginal probability of failure









where Pi,t is the probability at time t that bank i will fail in the next time period. Yi,t+1 is a dummy
variable taking on the value of 1 (0) if the bank failed (did not fail) in period t + 1. Xi,t is the
vector of n explanatory variables known at the end of period t. α and β represent the constant and
slope parameters characterizing the logistic function, respectively and are estimated via maximum
likelihood. A higher value of α + βXi,t indicates a higher probability of failure.
Common to most studies incorporating both market and accounting variables in explaining
failure, we face the issue that they are not available at the same frequencies. Following Arena
(2008) and Distinguin et al. (2006), we use accounting-based information measured yearly on
December 31st of each year. Similarly, market-based information related to CDS and equity are
also measured on a yearly basis on the final trading day of each year.4
The coefficients from a logistic function based model based can be used to quantify the marginal












)2 × β. (2)
The marginal effect is not constant because it depends on the specific values taken on by the
explanatory variables X. A common procedure, adopted in this study, is to evaluate the marginal
effect for the sample means of the explanatory variables.
4The majority of banks in our sample do not report interim results with sufficient granularity, so, in this study, we
use annual accounting data to forecast failure over the following year.
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4. Empirical Results
This section presents our main empirical results. The initial analysis considers the univariate
explanatory power of CDS spread changes. We then assess whether this explanatory power is
affected by introducing various accounting and market variables. We finally show how including
CDS changes in logit models increases the out-of-sample predictions of the models.
4.1. CDS spread changes and bank failure
We first empirically establish whether variations in single-name CDS spreads can be used as
early warning signals of bank financial distress. In particular, we want to examine whether the
use of CDS spread changes can improve the performance of bank failure models over and above
models that only use accounting and/or stock market indicators.
We start our empirical analysis by estimating a logit model with CDS spread changes as our
only explanatory variable. The results in Table 2 demonstrate a highly significant positive coef-
ficient of 1.59.5 Having ascertained that CDS spread changes significantly explain bank failure,
we next control for various facets of banking risk. To this end, accounting variables, stock returns
and the DD measure, are incrementally incorporated in the model as shown in Table 2. Coefficient
estimates for the CDS spread change remain positive and highly significant (at the 1% level) in all
specifications. The tier 1 regulatory capital ratio is also highly significant and negative. The DD
measure is significant at the 5% level and is negative. Stock returns are insignificant once we con-
trol for other aspects of banking risk. While previous research has found mixed explanatory power
associated with bank bond yields, these findings suggest that CDS spreads have strong ability to
discriminate between safe and distressed banks, even relative to equity market indicators.6
5In addition to yearly log changes, we also consider log changes in CDS spreads for 3, 6 and 9 months before
the forecasting interval. The results, Table A.1 of the Online Appendix, demonstrate a highly significant positive
coefficient for all horizons. For these univariate regressions the highest value of the McFadden R-squared is obtained
for the 1-year log change in CDS spread. In model M5, we also report the logit estimation when 1-year log stock
returns are instead used as the only explanatory variable. The estimated coefficient is negative but not statistically
significant. To explore the marginal explanatory ability of CDS spread changes relative to stock returns, the last model
specification (M6) includes both log CDS spread changes and log stock return as explanatory variables. Estimated
coefficients have the expected sign and are significant at the 10% significance level providing initial evidence for
marginal explanatory power of CDS relative to equity returns. This complementary explanatory power suggests that
CDS markets impound additional information over and above equity markets, relevant to policy makers and regulators.
6In Table A.3 of the Online Appendix we examine whether the explanatory power of CDS spread changes varies
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In order to get an idea of the relative influence of these variables, the marginal impact on
failure probability from a one-standard-deviation increase in each explanatory variable is examined
using Equation 2, assuming an initial mean value of the explanatory variables. For instance, if we
consider the sixth specification in Table 2 (M6), a one-standard-deviation increase in the CDS
spread change would increase the probability of failure by 14% of its initial value. Similarly, if
we focus on the seventh specification (M7), a one-standard-deviation increase in the CDS spread
change determines an increase in the failure probability of 12% of its initial value.7
4.2. Testing for the predictive ability of failure models
In this subsection, we conduct tests of out-of-sample predictive ability of several logit models
of forthcoming bank failure. Clustering of bank failures in our sample in year 2008 (20 out of 31
failed banks emanate from 2008), leads us to focus on the 2005-2008 period and estimate model
parameters with a starting estimation sample which uses 2005-2007 observations. The estimated
coefficients are then employed to compute the ex-ante bank default probabilities for year 2008.
Various studies have investigated the out-of-sample performance of bankruptcy prediction mod-
els (Bauer and Agarwal, 2014; Betz et al., 2014; Agarwal and Taffler, 2008). In a similar vein, we
employ a Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve to analyze out-of-sample performance.8
with a bank’s business model and find stronger results for investment banks. In untabulated results, we also examine
the explanatory power of CDS spread levels and the volatility of CDS spread changes. While both are significant in
isolation, they become insignificant when a full model specification is used which includes the DD measure. Fur-
thermore, we consider the role of country-level characteristics on the forecasting ability of CDS changes for bank
failure. We find that CDS spread changes remain highly significant indicators of bank distress after controlling for
these macroeconomic covariates. We also employ an alternative Cox proportional hazard estimation approach and find
that changes in CDS spreads are highly significant when adding the additional control variables. We finally exclude
US banks from our sample and run the same logit regressions as in Table 2, obtaining very similar results. Full results
for these additional tests are available from the authors on request.
7In the Online Appendix, we provide numerous tests to validate the robustness of our findings. First, we evaluate
the explanatory power of CDS spread changes during the shorter period 2005 − 2008 as the majority of bank failures
in our sample occurred in 2008 (see Table A.2). Second, we use alternative measures for CDS spread changes that
neutralize the effect of general market conditions (see Table A.4). Third, we employ alternative dependent variables:
a binary downgrade indicator and two additional continuous variables, namely ROAA volatility and the Z-score (see
Table A.5). Finally, we test whether subordinated CDS spread changes have similar explanatory power for bank
distress during our sample period (in Table A.6). In all cases, we find that changes in CDS spreads are strongly
associated with bank failure.
8The receiver operating characteristic measures the trade-off between correctly predicted failure and incorrectly
predicted non-failures. An ROC area under the curve of 1 would indicate complete forecasting accuracy. An ROC less
than 0.50 suggests that random selection would better predict failure out-of-sample than the prediction model.
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To determine the ability of CDS changes to distinguish between failed and surviving banks out-
of-sample, we adopt a simulation approach. In addition to testing our approach on data unused in
determining model parameters, this has the added benefits of facilitating analysis of the importance
of sample size on results. For each logit model, we run 1000 simulations of the ROC curve area.
For each simulation, model parameters are estimated during the 2005-2007 period using 50 banks
randomly selected. The estimated model coefficients are then used to predict default probabilities
for the remaining 10 banks which were not used in building the model.9
Results are detailed in Table 3. We have four simple models, each considering a single repre-
sentation of banking risk (based on ∆CDS , STOCK, Accounting and DD). The Accounting model
only uses accounting variables (namely, T1RC, LLPTA, CI, ROAE, LADEPST, SIZE) as covariates
to predict failure. We then run five bivariate models that combine the variables used in the univari-
ate models. Finally, we run two trivariate models, incorporating three sets of risk predictors.
The area under the ROC curve (AUC) is computed using the trapezoidal rule and its simulated
mean value reported in column 2 of Table 3 for each model. Column 3 shows the simulated mean
AUC standard error based on the unbiased estimator of Hanley and McNeil (1982), column 4 the
test statistic for the null hypothesis that the AUC is equal to 0.5 and column 5 the simulated mean
accuracy ratio (AR = 2 * (AUC - 0.5)) based on Engelmann et al. (2003). Column 6 reports the t-
statistic of a two-sample one-tailed t-test for the null of equality between the simulated mean AUC
of a univariate logit based on ∆CDS and that obtained from any of the remaining ten logit models.
When considered alone, ∆CDS has an AUC of 0.64, significantly different from the accuracy
obtained from random sampling. Combining ∆CDS with accounting or stock returns results in a
decrease in AUC, in keeping with the finding that information from the stock market or accounting
information adds little additional information relative to CDS. Combining ∆CDS with DD, we get
a AUC of 0.70, greater than that from ∆CDS alone. This predictive analysis further confirms that
CDS market information can be employed to generate useful predictive signals of bank distress.
9As a test of robustness, we also estimate the models using randomly chosen 30 banks to generate default proba-
bilities for the remaining 30 banks and obtain analogous results.
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5. Conclusions
This study is among the first to examine whether single-name CDS contracts help explain bank
failure, in keeping with the premise of indirect market discipline. For a sample of 60 banks, we
examine whether increases in CDS spread changes are associated with greater probability of fail-
ure. Furthermore, we control for an extensive range of alternative market and accounting measures.
The primary finding of the paper is that relative changes in firm-level CDS spreads are strongly and
significantly associated with future bank failure. This result holds when we control for alternative
equity market information and for accounting drivers of risk. Thus, monitoring changes in CDS
market prices could assist regulators and supervisors in forecasting future distress in individual
banks, thus providing indirect market discipline.
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Cole, R.A., White, L.J. (2012). Déjà vu all over again: The causes of U.S. commercial bank
failures this time around. Journal of Financial Services Research, 42(1), 5–29.
Conlon, T., Cotter, J. (2014). Anatomy of a bail-in. Journal of Financial Stability, 15, 257–263.
Curry, T. J., Fissel, G. S., Hanweck, G. A. (2008). Equity market information, bank holding
company risk, and market discipline. Journal of Banking and Finance, 32(5), 807–819.
15
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Detragiache, E., Merrouche, O. (2013). Bank capital: Lessons from the
financial crisis. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 45(6), 1147–1164.
Distinguin, I., Rous, P., Tarazi, A. (2006). Market discipline and the use of stock market data to
predict bank financial distress. Journal of Financial Services Research, 30(2), 151–176.
Eichengreen, B., Mody, A., Nedeljkovic, M., Sarno, L. (2012). How the Subprime Crisis went
global: Evidence from bank credit default swap spreads. Journal of International Money and
Finance, 31(5), 1299–1318.
Elton, E.J., Gruber, M.J., Agrawal, D., Mann, C. (2001). Explaining the rate spread on corporate
bonds. Journal of Finance, 56(1), 247–277.
Engelmann, B., Hayden, E., Tasche, D. (2003). Testing rating accuracy. Risk, 16, 82–86.
Evanoff, D. D., Wall, L. D. (2001). Sub-debt yield spreads as bank risk measures. Journal of
Financial Services Research, 20(2), 121–145.
Fahlenbrach, R., Prilmeier, R., Stulz, R.M. (2012). This time is the same: Using bank performance
in 1998 to explain bank performance during the recent financial crisis. Journal of Finance, 67(6).
Flannery, M.J. (1998). Using market information in prudential bank supervision: A review of the
U.S. empirical evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 30(3), 273.
Flannery, M.J. (2001). The faces of “market discipline”. Journal of Financial Services Research,
20(2), 107–119.
Goddard, J., Molyneux, P., Wilson, J.O.S. (2009). The financial crisis in Europe: Evolution, policy
responses and lessons for the future. Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 17(4),
362–380.
Gorton, G., Santomero, A.M. (1990). Market discipline and bank subordinated debt. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 22(1), 119–128.
16
Gropp, R., Vesala, J., Vulpes, G. (2006). Equity and bond market signals as leading indicators of
bank fragility. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38(2), 399–428.
Hamalainen, P., Pop, A., Hall, M., Howcroft, B. (2012). Did the market signal impending prob-
lems at Northern Rock? An analysis of four financial instruments. European Financial Man-
agement, 18(1), 68–87.
Hanley, J., McNeil, B. (1982). The meaning and use of the area under a receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve. Radiology, 143(1), 29–36.
Hasan, I., Liu, L., Zhang, G. (2016). The Determinants of Global Bank Credit-Default-Swap
Spreads. Journal of Financial Services Research, 50(3), 275–309.
Huang, J., Huang, M. (2012). How much of the corporate-Treasury yield spread is due to credit
risk? Review of Asset Pricing Studies, 2(2), 153–202.
Knaup, M., Wagner, W. (2012). A market-based measure of credit quality and bank performance
during the Subprime Crisis. Management Science, 58, 1423–1437.
Krainer, J. (2004). Incorporating equity market information into supervisory monitoring models.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 36(6), 1043–1067.
Krishnan, C.N.V., Ritchken, P.H., Thomson, J.B. (2005). Monitoring and controlling bank risk:
Does risky debt help? Journal of Finance, 60(1), 343–378.
Longstaff, F.A., Mithal, S., Neis, E. (2005). Corporate yield spreads: Default risk or liquidity?
New evidence from the credit default swap market. Journal of Finance, 60(5), 2213–2253.
Mannasoo, K., Mayes, D.G. (2009). Explaining bank distress in Eastern European transition
economies. Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(2), 244–253.
Mayes, D.G. (2004). Who pays for bank insolvency? Journal of International Money and Finance,
23, 515–551.
17
Miller, S., Olson, E., Yeager, T.J. (2015). The relative contributions of equity and subordinated
debt signals as predictors of bank distress during the financial crisis. Journal of Financial Sta-
bility, 16, 118–137.
Milne, A. (2014). Distance to default and the financial crisis. Journal of Financial Stability, 12,
26–36.
Molyneux, P., Schaeck, K., Zhou, T.M. (2014). ‘Too systemically important to fail’ in banking.
Journal of International Money and Finance, 49(B), 258–282.
Niu, J. (2008). Can subordinated debt constrain banks’ risk taking? Journal of Banking and
Finance, 32(6), 1110–1119.
Oehmke, M., Zawadowski, A. (2014). The anatomy of the CDS market. Columbia Business
School Working Paper.
Petrovic, A., Tutsch, R. (2009). National rescue measures in response to the current financial
crisis. ECB Legal Working Paper Series, 8.
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Table 3: ROC Curve Areas for Different Failure Models - Out of Sample Analysis
This table reports the results of 1000 simulations for the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics curve
obtained using several logit models that calculate ex-ante bank default probabilities for year 2008. For each
model, we estimate it during the 2005-2007 period using 50 banks randomly selected. We then use the estimated
coefficients to predict default probabilities of the remaining 10 banks in our sample. The models are based on
the following three sets of variables (and their combinations) used as covariates to predict failure: accounting
metrics, stock market variables (STOCK and DD) and ∆CDS . The accounting variables include the following:
T1RC, LLPTA, CI, ROAE, LADEPST, SIZE. In column 2, we report the simulated mean area under the ROC
curve (AUC) computed using the trapezoidal rule. Column 3 shows the simulated mean standard error for the
AUC, column 4 reports the test statistic for the null hypothesis that the AUC is equal to 0.5, column 5 reports the
simulated mean accuracy ratio (AR = 2 * (AUC - 0.5)). Finally, column 6 shows the t-statistic of a two-sample one-
tailed t-test for the null hypothesis that there is equality between the simulated mean areas under the ROC curve
obtained from a model using ∆CDS only and any of the other remaining models. All t-statistics are significant at
the 1% level.
Model AUC SE z AR t-test
∆CDS 0.64 0.0913 6.98 0.27 -
S TOCK 0.49 0.1023 4.78 -0.02 68.94
Accounting 0.53 0.0990 5.33 0.06 39.70
DD 0.78 0.0847 9.41 0.55 -41.54
∆CDS + S TOCK 0.60 0.1072 5.59 0.20 14.49
∆CDS + DD 0.70 0.0975 7.38 0.40 -15.34
∆CDS + Accounting 0.53 0.1058 5.03 0.06 36.24
S TOCK + Accounting 0.52 0.1178 4.44 0.05 361.90
DD + Accounting 0.58 0.1172 4.98 0.16 16.11
∆CDS + S TOCK + Accounting 0.52 0.1259 4.14 0.04 35.45
∆CDS + Accounting + DD 0.54 0.1258 4.28 0.08 30.16
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1
A. Definitions of Variables and Motivating Literature
Variables Mnemonics Expected Sign Source
Dependent variables - Binary
Failure indicator
Downgrade indicator





Tier 1 regulatory capital ratio T1RC - Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2013); Beltratti and Stulz (2012)
Asset quality
Loan loss provisions to total assets LLPTA + Poghosyan and Čihak (2011); Curry et al. (2008)
Management quality
Cost to income ratio CI + Cole and White (2012); Mannasoo and Mayes (2009)
Earnings quality
Return on average equity ROAE - Poghosyan and Čihak (2011); Arena (2008)
Liquidity
Liquid assets to total deposits and borrowing LADEPST - Beltratti and Stulz (2012)
Size of institution
Natural logarithm of total assets SIZE - Molyneux et al. (2014); Curry et al. (2008).
Financial market variables
CDS market
Yearly log change in senior CDS spread ∆CDS +
Yearly log change in senior excess CDS spread ∆EXCDS +
Yearly log change in senior idiosyncratic CDS spread ∆IDCDS +
Log of senior CDS spread CDS +
Volatility of daily log changes in senior CDS spread over the past 3 months CDSVOL +
Yearly log change in subordinated CDS spread ∆CDS S UB +
3-month log change in senior CDS spread ∆CDS 3M +
6-month log change in senior CDS spread ∆CDS 6M +
9-month log change in senior CDS spread ∆CDS 9M +
Equity market
Yearly log stock return STOCK - Distinguin et al. (2006)
Distance-to-Default DD - Gropp et al. (2006)
2
Table A.1: Logit Regressions of Failure Indicator on CDS Changes of 3, 6, 9 and 12 Months
This table summarizes results of binary logit regressions of the failure indicator on CDS log changes of the past
3, 6, 9 and 12 months before the portfolio formation (end of each year) from 2005 to 2012. The failure indicator
is 1 (0) if the firm failed (did not fail) during the subsequent 12 months. ∆CDS 3M is the 3-month log change in
the CDS spread. ∆CDS 6M is the 6-month log change in the CDS spread. ∆CDS 3M is the 9-month log change
in the CDS spread. ∆CDS is the annual log change in the CDS spread. STOCK is the annual log stock return.
Pseudo R2 is the value of the McFadden R-squared. Nobs is the number of observations. We report the z-statistics
in parentheses and adjust standard errors using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** denote significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. We report 6 different specifications of the logit regressions (M1 to M6). For
instance, M1 regresses the failure indicator on a constant and the 3-month log change in the CDS spread.











-2.59*** -2.99*** -3.03*** -3.62*** -2.15*** -4.41***
(-8.62) (-9.43) (-8.83) (-8.20) (-9.51) (-7.00)
Pseudo R2 0.136 0.186 0.185 0.243 0.006 0.312






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.3: Logit Regressions of Failure Indicator on CDS Spread Changes for Different Categories of Banks
This table summarizes results of binary logit regressions of the failure indicator on CDS spread
changes of banks with different specializations and listing status. The sample period is from 2005
to 2012. The failure indicator is 1 (0) if the firm failed (did not fail) during the subsequent 12
months. ∆CDS is the log change in the CDS spread. COOP is a dummy variable which equals 1
for cooperative banks and zero otherwise; INVB is a dummy variable which equals 1 for investment
banks and zero otherwise; LISTED is a dummy variable which equals 1 for listed banks and zero
otherwise. T1RC is the tier 1 regulatory capital ratio. LLPTA represents the ratio between the loan
loss provisions and the book value of total assets. CI is the ratio between the operating costs and the
operating income. ROAE is the return on average equity. LADEPST is the ratio between the liquid
assets and the sum of the total deposits and short-term borrowing. SIZE is the log of total assets.
Pseudo R2 is the value of the McFadden R-squared. Nobs is the number of observations. We report
the z-statistics in parentheses and adjust standard errors using the Huber-White method. *, ** and











LIS T ED × ∆CDS
0.03
(0.06)



















Pseudo R2 0.309 0.344 0.305




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.5: OLS Regressions of ROAA Volatility and Z-score and Logit Regressions of Downgrade Indicator on
CDS Changes
This table summarizes results of OLS regressions of ROAA volatility on CDS Changes (M1, M2 and M3), OLS
regressions of Z-score on CDS Changes (M4, M5 and M6) and binary logit regressions of downgrade indicator on
CDS Changes (M7, M8, and M9). The sample period is from 2005 to 2012. The ROAA volatility is the standard
deviation of the ROAA for each firm over the subsequent 12 months. The Z-score refers to the 12 months following
portfolio formation. The downgrade indicator is 1 (0) if the firm is first downgraded (not downgraded) by any of
the major rating agencies (Fitch, Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s) during the subsequent 12 months.∆CDS is the
log change in the CDS spread. T1RC is the tier 1 regulatory capital ratio. LLPTA represents the ratio between
the loan loss provisions and the book value of total assets. CI is the ratio between the operating costs and the
operating income. ROAE is the return on average equity. LADEPST is the ratio between the liquid assets and
the sum of the total deposits and short-term borrowing. SIZE is the log of total assets. STOCK is the log stock
return. DD is the distance-to-default measure. R2 is the value of the adjusted (McFadden) R-squared for OLS
regressions (logit regressions). Nobs is the number of observations. In parentheses, we report the t-statistics for
OLS regressions and z-statistics (adjusting standard errors using the Huber-White method) for logit regressions.
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
∆CDS
0.10 0.08*** 0.09*** -18.45*** -24.27*** -21.74*** 0.88*** 1.15*** 0.45
(1.52) (4.27) (4.22) (-4.78) (-4.26) (-3.42) (4.64) (3.80) (1.26)
T1RC -0.00 -0.00 0.93 1.36 -0.06 -0.05(-0.56) (-0.42) (0.39) (0.56) (-0.39) (-0.42)
LLPT A
23.29*** 20.46*** -2771.12 -2554.60 200.20 360.68**
(2.86) (2.64) (-1.19) (-1.16) (1.27) (2.00)
CI
0.00 0.00 -0.21 -0.20 0.02 0.03
(1.09) (0.96) (-0.87) (-0.85) (1.07) (1.07)
ROAE
-0.00 -0.00 0.02 -0.22 0.07 0.05
(-1.51) (-1.36) (0.03) (-0.31) (1.49) (1.36)
LADEPS T
0.00** 0.00** -0.98** -1.00** 0.02 0.03
(2.15) (2.05) (-2.37) (-2.43) (1.21) (1.38)
S IZE
0.00 0.00 8.36* 8.32* 0.35 0.26








0.38*** 0.10 0.06 58.06*** -60.35 -71.23 -1.49*** -11.76** -8.50
(5.72) (0.33) (0.18) (15.65) (-0.69) (-0.81) (-6.80) (-2.35) (-1.57)
R2 0.004 0.198 0.193 0.057 0.116 0.119 0.114 0.300 0.304
Nobs 366 175 175 361 174 174 188 118 118
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